How can the European Union continue to exert influence on domestic developments in new member states once they have achieved accession? Since joining the EU both Bulgaria and Romania continue to suffer the ongoing problems of judicial corruption and organized crime and in an unprecedented move the EU continues to monitor its two newest members on compliance in these areas but has struggled to effect change. This book asks why Bulgaria and Romania have such uneven records when it comes to post-accession compliance and identifies the two key factors preventing improvements; domestic priorities and clientelism. It examines how, once EU membership was achieved, the new member states prioritized their domestic politics and patrimonial networks resulting in a failure of compliance with the EU’’s conditions as the organization no longer had strong enough incentives or sanctions to trump the domestic elite’’s priorities or the power of pervasive patron-client relationships. It explores how non-governmental organizations and the media, plagued by the same problems, are unable to properly monitor the political elites in these countries and how these various factors combine to shift the balance of power from Brussels to Bucharest and Sofia.